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tfie city "ducktair is an inbred
naturally bad person of idle and degenerate mind.
His, or sadly her, day usually starts at about eleven
in the morning with a few dagga cigarettes and a brandy,
during which a broken comb is drawn through their greasy
locks. Washing is, of course, indicative of a "square".
Then to King George, Bree, Nugget or Gold Streets if
Joh'burg type. A supply of the cheapest brandy is obtained,
and cash and dagga from the numerous Natives in that area
easily, and practically openly exchanged. At least a hundred
per cent profit has been made so more brandy is bought under
assumed names. After a meal at a Greek cafe a stroll is
made pn] the nearby open pieces of land such as Joubert Park
or End Street Park for dagga smoking and drinking and other
"ducktail" sports. Sleeping off the effects also occupy our
heroes and heroines.
The President Street tea room bioscopes are a Mecca also for
the "Sheilas" where a trade in prostitution and blackmail is
carried on the best part of twelve days. The fact that these
creatures are around these parks, tea room bioscopes and low
cafes indicate that they have no set income from honest
labour and no desire to engage in it, either...1
1
 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CAD), Department of Social Welfare (VWN), SW109/4, Inderdepartmentele KommHtee Insake Jeugmisdaad , Appendix III:
Study of the Ductails (anonymous), 1958 p. 13-14.
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An experimental work in progress, please do not quote
The Ducktails were a white youth gang subculture, which emerged within post Second World War South Africa. They
were rebellious, hedonistic, apolitical and displayed little respect for the law, education or work. There were different
levels of belonging in the subculture, which took diffuse and distilled forms and which could at times become conflated.
For some, the Ducktail era was characterised by knuckle-dusters and bicycle chains, quiffs and Brylcreem, bioscopes
and sessions, confrontations with the police and petty-crime, whilst for others it represented weekend jolls, rock 'n roll
and jiving, and 'stove-pipe' trousers and 'fifty-yard' petticoats2. For the majority of Ducktails however it was a fashion
movement. The latter group of ducktails did not present a real danger3 to 'conventional' society and engaged
predominantly with the stylistic elements of the subculture. The former group ignited very real concerns and fears in
public opinion due to their aggressive and violent behaviour, which was attached to the subculture as a whole.4 State
responses to the subculture's identity was largely founded on specious information such as distortions, rumours, and
stereotypes expressed on three intenelated yet different discursive platforms: government commissions, academic
texts and the press. The result was the generation of a moral panic that demonised the movement branding it as -
amongst other things - the 'eendstert euwel'. Through this process 'juvenile delinquenc/ became a metaphor for
exploring wider social concerns such as the family, child rearing, parenting, working mothers, marriage, entertainment
and the state of the nation. The intenelated discourses (racial, patriarchal and religious) moral guardians relied on for
their understanding of 'delinquenc/ were entangled in a web of an 'enveloping discourse, a grand murmure* on
morality that intersected with hegemonic ideologies of apartheid. The effect of the discourses was the formulation of
what the government wanted the white populace to be, namely conformist, nationalistic, law-abiding citizens who
valued morality, Christianity and the belief in white supremacy. This paper hopes to explore ways of understanding and
measuring the impact that distortions, rumours and suspicions have on the production of knowledge that is later utilised
for designing state policies.
During the course of the 1950s, ways of perceiving white youths and 'juvenile delinquents' underwent a series of
changes. Legislation was modified to deal with new forms of youth 'misbehaviour' and crime: the police force was given
extra powers, punishment was redefined and parents were made accountable for their children's behaviour. A range of
discursive practices - government commissions of enquiry, conferences, academic texts and increased press coverage
on youths - led to this transformation and resulted in the production of new knowledge and 'truths' about youths and
'delinquency'. The major development signifying this change was the unfolding of a moral panic over 'Ducktailism'6 and
'juvenile delinquency1 which was premised on specious information such as distortions, rumours and stereotypes. The
discourses (racist, religious and patriarchal) used in understanding youths were produced by a variety of 'experts' and
were considered to be 'true' reflections of social reality because they were legitimised and produced in 'respected'
institutions and government departments. For the most part, the discourses shied away from theoretical discussions on
'delinquency' and collapsed into a description of the moral characteristics of such youths. The power of these particular
discourses lies in the way in which legislation was rapidly transformed to deal with 'delinquent' and 'deviant' youths.
'Deviance' for Sociologist Howard S. Becker should be perceived from the point of view of those who define certain
forms of behaviour as 'deviant1. For him, 'deviancy' is the result of a process of labelling by 'moral entrepreneurs'.7
Through this 'what started out as a drive to convince the world of the moral necessity of a new rule finally becomes an
organisation devoted to the enforcement of the rule.'8 This process of rule creation is more often than not accompanied
by the generation of a moral panic9. Usually moral panics are based on the reaction of a few moral guardians to certain
phenomena. These 'moral entrepreneurs' (including official and non-official authorities such as intellectuals, teachers,
2
 A 'fifty yard petticoat' is one comprised of a few layers of net which was usually stiffened with sugar water.
3Danger here refers to physical and verbal abuse, assault and crime.
4This is by no means a fixed division. Membership is probably viewed more accurately on a spectrum ranging from involvement on the periphery to direct participation in all
aspects of the movement. The subculture itself was comprised of an aggregation of many different social groups.
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 M. Leps, Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth Century Discourse, Duke University Press, USA, 1992, p. 13.
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 For more insight into the Ducktail subculture see K. Mooney, 'Ducktails, Flick-knives and Pugnacity': Subcuttural and Hegemonic Masculinities in South Africa,
1948-1960, in Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 24, No.4, December 1998, pp. 753-774.
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 It must be stressed that this 'social reaction' perspective is not intended to be a causative theory (i.e. labelling as the cause of 'deviance'); rather it is a




 Pearson traces this back to England in the late Victorian era with the "garrotting panic". His study of "hooligans" from London indicates that there was an
identifiable youth culture to be found amongst them. They all adopted the same dress style, most distinctive features were "'bell-bottom' (narrow-go-wides)
trousers, neck scarves, heavy belts, peaked caps and short cropped hair with a 'donkey fringe'". They even had their own slang for example, "coats and boots"
were "daisy-roots". Similarities in style were noticed in both Manchester and Australia, See Pearson, G, "Victorian Boys we are here" in Gelder, K & Thornton,
S, (eds), The Subcultures Reader, Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 288-290. Youth cultures were also visible in the 1920s. As Griffin notes, "the 'roaring twenties'
saw a widespread moral panic over youthful female sexuality on both sides of the Atlantic," C. Griffin, Representations of Youth, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993,
p. 18.
bishops, priests, editors, community leaders and politicians) united in opposition to the Ducktail phenomenon, and
formulated policies to preclude the outbreak of similar activities. The prime actors that were involved in this process of
rule creation and in initiating moral panics included: academics such as L.F. Freed10, G. Cronje and various members
of the Department of Social Welfare, the South African Police and researchers affiliated to government research
institutes such as the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research (NBESR).
The moral panic unfolded from three related yet distinct discursive platforms: government commissions of inquiry,
academic texts and increased press coverage. Their commonality lies in the way in which they produced types of
knowledge within their own institutional boundaries that at the same time distinguished them from one another,
primarily due to the varied forces (exerted by individuals or the state) that controlled their functioning. Collectively
however the moral panic was raised to new heights of hysteria, which had enduring consequences leading to changes
in legislation, social policies and the production of new body of knowledge on youth. It is a major contention of this
paper that 'Ducktailism' and white 'juvenile delinquency1 more generally was utilised as a metaphor for exploring social
problems, such as conflicts over popular culture, child rearing, marriage, working mothers, morality, the declining
influence of religion, white identities and the state of the nation and its future. This resulted in the proposal of various
'solutions' that would effectively 'rescue and rehabilitate wayward youths and ineluctably curt) 'Ducktailism' and by
extension to define whiteness.
White youths11 have been the focus of a number of official reports, legislative measures and government
interventions.12 They have also featured regularly in the local press and formed part of the research agendas of various
academics. Despite this concern expressed about white youths and their activities, systematic studies focusing on them
are a rarity within South African historiography. Even less has been produced on the process involved in the designing
of policies aimed at monitoring the behaviour of certain members of the white community.13 The importance of
exploring policies and research into youths specifically is twofold. Firstly, for the contribution it makes towards
documenting a social history of youth and secondly for the way in which it provides 'a history of adults' preoccupations
and panics - at least over certain groups of young people, and by certain groups of adults.'14
The first part of this paper outlines the commissions that were initiated by the government to investigate the 'problem of
youth'. The range of discourses that rule creators relied on for their understandings of white youths will form the bulk of
the second part of this paper. Finally, the way in which illusive information was upheld as 'truths' will be unravelled in
the context of a new body of knowledge on youths that was used to amend existing legislation and policies on youth.
Overall, the paper hopes to provide a better understanding of the complex relationship that emerged between the
government, academics, rule creators and other moral guardians involved in the process of designing youth policies
and in the formulation of certain 'truths'. The paper will therefore make a small contribution towards the few studies that
exist on the production of knowledge/truths, social research policies and government planning in relation to white South
African communities.
Discursive Platforms: Government Commissions, Academic Texts and the Press
Research institutes are principally engaged in the production of 'knowledge' and new understandings on a variety of
themes and topics. In the South African case, the state has played a central role in this process by providing interstices
in the form of research institutes for researchers and academics to generate ideas. Within the context of the continued
popularity of social history, the history of ideas has in recent years been regarded with suspicion due to the tendency of
focusing on a few ideas of 'great men and women'. Nevertheless, it is a field of central importance particularly with
regard to documenting a history on the production of knowledge, truths, and of measuring the impact that intellectual
and political history makes at the national level.15 Similarly, an exploration of social research entities, universities and
government commissions is important for what is revealed about intellectual trends and the way in which types of
knowledge are considered to represent the truth. Despite this, 'intellectual' history is a relatively under researched area
10Freed is a fascinating character and was a key player in the creation of a moral panic concerning ducktails and youth crime. Besides being a specialist in
•juvenile delinquency', he was also an expert in sexually transmitted diseases. In addition, he was a lecturer in psychiatry and social medicine at the University
of the Witwatersrand.
11
 A comparative analysis between the treatment of black and white youths is essential. Unfortunately, it is not within the scope to discuss these issues.
12For example, Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Administration of the Children's Protection Act (1929); Committee to Enquire into Destitute,
Neglected and Delinquent Children and Young Persons (1934); Memorandum on Juveniles and Juvenile Adults Charged Before the Juvenile Courts on the
Reef (1935); Bantu Juvenile Delinquency Conference (1938); Commission into keeping Juveniles out of Prison (1944); Special Problems, Crime, Juvenile
Delinquency and Penal Reform (1946-7); United National Organisation, Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Juvenile Offenders (1950); Juvenile Delinquency,
Extent, Cause, Prevention (1943-1960); Jeugmisdaad Kinders in Bioskoop-Kafees en Kafees (1957-9); Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Offenders
(Juvenile Delinquents) (1956); Inter-Departmental Committee Report for Juvenile Crime, with Regard to the Nature and Extent of Juvenile Delinquency (1958);
and finally Report of the Commission of Inquiry with Regard to Undesirable Publications (1957).
13However, much can be learnt from studies, which explore the formulation of apartheid policies. The major authorities on policy and apartheid include the work
of Deborah Posel and John Lazar. The latter deals with apartheid policies in relation to African communities whilst the former analysis is based on policies of
economic and social upliftment in white communities. These works are illuminating for what they reveal about the role of different government departments in
the formulation of national policies. See D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991 and J.W.
Lazar, 'Conformity and conflict: Afrikaner Nationalist Politics in South Africa, 1948-1961, PhD. Balliol College, Oxford, 1987.
14C. Griffin, Representations of Youth, p. 23.
15Rich,P.B, Hope and Despair, English-speaking Intellectuals and South African Politics, 196-1976, British Academic Press, London, 1993. p. 6.
in South African historiography, with the work of Miller, Fleisch, Rich and Dubow16 being the major exceptions. Even
then, the major focus of their studies is on the evolution of ideas held by individual academics, R.F.A. Hoemle and E.G.
Malherbe for example, and how their individual modes of thought and ideas have contributed towards creating
segregationist and apartheid policies.
With the exception of Adam Ashforth's The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth Century South Africa17 and the
papers produced for the TRC: Commissioning the Past conference held in June this year,18 government commissions
of enquiry have been patchily researched in South African historiography. In particular the way in which government
commissions, research units, academic texts, and the media collectively legitimise knowledge and produce 'truths'
(about a range of social phenomena) which are then transmitted by increased press coverage and accepted in public
opinion as truth-values has been neglected. This is surprising since one of the most common state practices is the
publication of reports written from official investigative inquiries, departmental and interdepartmental committees set up
to probe into perceived social, economic and political 'problems'. Committee members are appointed by ministers and
are classified as 'experts' in the field. The main function of these commissions is to produce information and knowledge
that is used in various government policies of social engineering and restructuring. It is important to stress that 'the
ritualized proceedings of commissions are not just modes of scientific investigation but are also performances which
serve to authorize a form of social discourse[s].'19 As will be shown later government officials relied on a range of
discourses that served to convert their ideas into truths which in turn became absorbed into a body of knowledge on
Ducktails and white youths.
These government commissions provided a more official platform for members of government departments to work
alongside prominent intellectuals and other so-called 'experts' in the formulation of policies on youths. In the context of
designing policies, this alliance reveals much about how 'state institutions enable and constrain the powers of various
state actors, in historically specific ways.'20 The government played a major role in influencing the production of
knowledge and setting the parameters of research into youths primarily because they funded such research projects
but also as they monitored and set agendas for projects. Relations of power and knowledge were acted out in the
spaces provided by government commissions of inquiry and articulated through the discourses utilised by moral
guardians. As Foucault succinctly argues:
power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power
relations.21
The 'field of knowledge' on youths drew on quantitative and qualitative methodologies and data including: statistical
studies, press cuttings, surveys, empirical and ecological studies with the central object being the formulation of
policies that would instil, into rebellious youths, discipline and an appropriate moral system. Central to an
understanding of this knowledge field is unravelling the '..the process of the production of a discourse.'22 Before
focussing on this process the spaces in which they unfolded needs to be sketched.
Between 1955 and 1960 four major enquiries were commissioned by the government to investigate 'idle', 'lawless',
'deviant' and 'delinquent' youths. The first enquiry was initiated by the South African Police (SAP) suggesting that
government departments enjoyed a certain amount of independence to probe into what they considered potential 'social
problems'. In 1955, the Commissioner of Police approached the Department of Social Welfare to recommend that article 14
of the Law on Work Colonies Act (No 25) of 1949 be amended to increase the police's power23 to deal with 'ledige, losbandige
en wanordelike persone'2* Members of the Department of Social Welfare and the SAP fiercely debated this issue with the
former group playing a more dominant role. A commission of enquiry resulted in which the Department of Social Welfare
played a leading role. They conducted a regional survey which established that besides unemployed adults and criminal
offenders a high proportion of the 'types' with which the SAP were concerned comprised youths and Ducktails. Thereafter
the survey method became a trademark of the Department of Social Welfare's research methodologies and repertoire.25
After a thorough analysis' of the data, they concluded that existing legislation should be revised and new policies
1S
 The work of P. Rich, R.B. Miller, 'Science and Society in the Early Career of H.F. Verwoerd, JSAS, Vol. 19, No. 4, 1993, and Science, Sociology and Social
Engineering: South Africa in the 1930s (unpublished paper), 1995, and B. Fleisch "Social Scientists as Policy Makers: E.G. Malherbe and the National Bureau
for Educational and Social Research, 1929-1943, African Studies Institute, paper no. 332,1993.have contributed much to this history.
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 A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990.
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 The TRC: Commissioning the Past conference co-hosted by the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand and the Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation (11 l h - 14th of June 1999) was the first conference that placed government commissions at the centre of investigations.
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 A. Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South Africa, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 9.
20
 D. Posel, The Making of Apartheid, p. 271.
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 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by A. Sheridan, Penguin Books, England, 1979, p. 27.
22
 Based on the ideas of Hindess and Hindess and Hirst in F. Burton and P. Carien, Official Discourse: On discourse analysis, government publications,
ideology and the state, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, p. 67.
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 This group of rule creators believed that in order to eliminate this "dreigende gevaaf (imminent danger) the W o r k colonies Act (No 25) of 1 9 4 9 be a m e n d e d to grant
the police power to arrest suspects without a warrant, t ake their fingerprints and send them to the magistrates court.
24CAD, VWN, 402, SW61/55, letter from the Secretary of Social Welfare, 20/5/1958.
25A broader aim of my dissertation will be to trace the various research methods which government departments considered as reliable and valid.
formulated and implemented to bring 'lawless [and unemployed] youths' under strict government control. Their
argument was accepted more readily than that of the SAP due to the 'scientific' methods they utilised. Due to the
conflicts and differences in opinion between this group of rule creators (SAP and the Department of Social Welfare) the
question of amending existing legislation was delayed and only revived again in 1958 when the whole question of work
colonies was raised at the ministerial level. These delays in dealing with what the SAP considered to be a 'problem'
-reveals-how-the^formulation-otconcrete-poltcies-is noLa-SteadilyLunfolding, seamless process but is rather more jagged
and complex, characterised by contradictions, fluctuating power relations and a diversity of opinions.
Simultaneously, delinquency was also investigated by the National Advisory Committee who concluded that youth crime
in South Africa occurred more frequently than in the United States, Canada and England.26 This concern with 'delinquency1
received attention at the International Conference on Social Problems in Munchen, Germany, in 1956. In fact in the 1950s,
'delinquency' was placed on the research agendas of government's across the globe.27 This increasing concern (expressed
by those who held more power in the government) over 'delinquency1 and 'deviant youths both locally and internationally
was another contributing factor towards the creation of a moral panic. Agitation by moral guardians resulted in further
actions to combat this 'dreigende gevaaf on a national basis. Therefore, the moral panic over white youths expanded
drawing in more rule creators from a diversity of government departments, organisations, research institutes and
universities.
For example in March 1956 the first major regional conference28 devoted exclusively to white youths was convened in
Johannesburg. This was one of the largest conferences of its kind at which over two hundred delegates (representing
ninety welfare, charity and government organisations) participated under the directorship of Dr. Graham C.B. Bain.29.
This conference on the 'Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency1, was sponsored by the Johannesburg City Council, the
National Council of Women and the Johannesburg Youth Council.30 Dr. Bain was highly qualified (holding a BA, LLB, MA,
PhD) and was considered to be one of the leading 'experts' on the subject of 'delinquency1 at that time. He was also former
Chief Probation Officer of the Union government. He ensured that both the opinions of the government and academics
were considered, thus continuing with the tradition (initially formalised by the work of the Carnegie commission) of applying
social research to national problems. The conference extended over three days where the findings and recommendations
of the subcommittees on the home, schools, employment, leisure time, the press and the probation system were discussed.
The major focus of the conference was to ascertain means to prevent 'delinquency' nationally.
The committees recommendations were only implemented in the late 1950s after the 1956 conference organised by the
Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CTCASS) in Kampala.31 This was the second
research entity in Africa that ensured international co-operation between different countries. One of the first major
conferences organised by them was the 'Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Juvenile Offenders' held in Kampala
in 1956.32 In South Africa, preparation for the commission began in September 1955 under the guidance of Mr V.R. Verster
(the Director of Prisons) with the Departments of Justice, Education Arts and Science, Social Welfare, Native Affairs, and
External Affairs also participating.33 This conference confined itself to a discussion on the treatment of youth offenders in
which the legal, penological and administrative aspects were given precedence. The Kampala conference is of importance
because of the far reaching consequences that it had for the formulation of youth policies, research and knowledge on
youth in South Africa. Immediately after the South African delegates returned home, the Port Elizabeth Committee for
Combating Juvenile Delinquency and the Ringskommissie vir die Bestryding van Maatskaplikke Euwels, were established
alongside a permanent advisory board - the Interdepartmentele AcMsenende Komitee insake Jeugwangedrag (IAKJ).34 The
latter was created for the purposes of closely monitoring the behaviour of white youths in South Africa. One of their first
projects was to investigate the nature and extent of white 'juvenile misdemeanour1, the efficiency of existing legislation in
combating the problem, and the desirability of additional legislation and new policies. The interdepartmental committee was
composed of a range of pedagogues including prominent educationists, psychologists, sociologists, jurists and members of
2 6CAD, V W N , 402, SW61/55 Memo to the Minister of Social welfare outlines paper put together by the National Research Bureau, Department of Education Art
and Science: Onaanpasbare en onbeheerbare Jeugdiges.
27For example, in the USA the Interim Report of the Committee on the Judiciary: Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency was released in 1955, see CAD, SRP
6/497, UG42-1957, Report of the Commission of Enquiry with Regard to Undesirable Publications. In Britain, the Conservative Party commissioned various
enquiries into youth crime and youths behaviour. These include a report produced in 1946 titled Youth Astray, in 1955 Citizens of Tomorrow and The
Responsible Society in 1959, see G. Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears, Macmillan, London, 1983, pp. 15-16.
28For a brief summary of the proceedings see Historical Papers, University of the Wtwatersrand, South African Institute of Race Relations, AD1947/36.2,
general purposes committee meeting held on 26/04/1956.
Dr. Bain was also highly qualified and held a BA, LLB, MA and PhD.
" C A D , South African Police (SAP), 476, 2/9/50, vol. I, "Johannesburg Conference on the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, 1956°.
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 The CTCASS was created by the signing of an agreement, in London, between the govemments of Belgium, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France,
Portugal, the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom on the 18th of January 1954(See CAD, NTS, 894/400 (4) (1) - 894/400 (8), Explanatory Memorandum
on the Agenda. The major goal of the agreement was to ensure co-operation between member govemments and to administer the Inter-African Research Fund and
the Inter-African Foundation for the exchange of Scientists and Technicians. The CTCASS convened annually and was funded by the member governments. They also
worked in conjunction with the Scientific Council for Africa SoUh of the Sahara (SCASS) which was established in 1950 (The establishment of the CSA was also
stimulated as a resulted of the Johannesburg Scientific Conference held in 1949, see CAD, NTS, 1840, 894/400 (4) (1) - 894/400 (8), "Commission for
Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara")
32
 CAD, V W N , 751 , SW109/4, EN/L/1/25, CCTCA, Second meeting of the Inter-African Conference on the Treatment of Offenders (Juvenile Delinquents),
Kampala, Uganda, October 1956.
33
 CAD, V W N , 747, SW109, circular titled, "C.C.T.A. Konferensie oor Jeugmisdaad: Oktober tot November 1956: Uganda", signed J.A. de Ridder, 5/01/1956.
34
 The IAKJ was comprised exclusively of Afrikaans speaking members. The minutes of meetings and reports produced were all in Afrikaans.
government departments including Education, Arts and Science, Social Welfare, Justice, Labour, Police and Prisons.35 It
was through this official, permanent committee that the relationship between the government, social scientists and other
moral guardians solidified. As a result, finally in 1957 the Senate adopted a resolution expressing their concern at 'the
extent of juvenile delinquency amongst Europeans' and requested that the government give serious attention to the
matter.36 From 1957 onwards, government departments embarked on the process of collecting evidence on the extent
of delinquency'. The Department of Social Welfare played a pivotal role in this process and this was a role they were to
continue with well into the 1960s.
In 1958, the government instructed regional representatives of the Department of Social Welfare to write detailed
reports on the extent of 'juvenile delinquency1 with a particular focus on the 'Eendstert euwel'. The interlocutors
reported that the Ducktails presence was visible in the major urban centres including Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape
Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein and Kimberiy. However, the extent to which the Ducktails
presence was considered disruptive varied from one area to another.37 The process of formulating policies was
therefore subject to conflicts and shifting power relations between policy designers and rule creators. These official
reports were later utilised as evidence in the projects undertaken by the IAKJ.
As mentioned earlier, the IAKJ was established as a direct result of the CTCASS's conference. This permanent body was
instructed to work in conjunction with the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research38 who would perform an
advisory role. The first major investigation that this team of 'moral entrepreneurs' and rule creators undertook was to
establish the nature and extent of 'jeugwangedrag en die wenslikheid van wetgewing in die verband'. Although the
members of the committee were drawn from government departments, members of the NBESR were present at all of the
meetings. Mr P. Grobbelaar (Department of Education, Arts and Science) headed the committee with Prof. H.J. Venter39,
Dr. P.J. van der Walt40, Prof. B.F. Nel and Prof. G. Cronje41 representing Universities. All of these members were prominent
intellectuals based at Afrikaans medium institutions such as the University of Pretoria and UNISA.42 In the late 1950s, the
government instructed the NBESR along with the Department of Social Welfare and the SAP to thoroughly investigate
'juvenile delinquency1. The inclusion of academics effectively elevated the findings of research projects to the status of
truths that were absorbed by the public via the press.
At the same time between 1951 and 1957, the NBESR conducted their own independent research into crime with at
least one study being produced and published annually. In 1964 a series of publications were released, J.D. Venter's
The Incidence of Juvenile Crime in South Africa. An Analysis of the Problem based on Available Infomation being one
of the first in the series. In the same year, J.M. Lotter's research, "n Ekologiese Ontleding van Misdaad in Pretoria'
(funded by the NBESR) was also published. Other titles included 'Die Etiologie van Jeugmisdaad', 'Die Shoplifter, 'n
Psigologies-Sociologiese en Psigologies-Etnologiese Studie van die Oorsake. Besondere behandelingsmetodes', 'Die
invtoed van die rolprenten lektuurop die houdings en gedrag van Jeugdiges' were also.43 Two other influential studies,
which received partial assistance from the NBESR, include Dr. L.F. Freed's study, Crime in South Africa: An Integralist
Account and G.K. Engelbrecht's study - 'Jeugmisdaadareas en Aanverwante Verskynsels in Johannesburg1. The
35CAD, VWN, 751, SW109/4, vol. Ill, letter from Mr. J.J. Serfontein (Minister of Education, Arts and Science to the editor of the Cape Times, 11/06/1959.
^CAD, SAP, 476, 2/9/50, vol. I, T h e Parliament of the Union of South Africa, the Senate: Resolution, signed W.T. Wood (Clerk of the Senate, 12/02/1957.
37
 For example, Mr Olivier reported that in the Johannesburg region, in places closer to the rural areas, their presence was not a problem. In contrast, in areas
closer to the Rand (Vereeniging, Sasolburg, East and West Rand) the Ducktails apparently 'agitate the public, participate in premarital sex and offend the
church'. According to Mr Albertyn, in Cape Town Ducktail activities had decreased by 1958. However, there existed a group of coloured youths that were
adopting the style of the Ducktails. In Durban and Pietermarrtzburg, according to Mr Bothnia's report there were groupings of Ducktails but their activities were
viewed as no cause for alarm. Mr Winckler alleged that in Port Elizabeth there had been a clash between the Ducktails and bus drivers but nothing else was
recorded as being serious. In East London, Mr Louw stated that although the Ducktails presence was strong they were not especially aggressive and were less
inclined to break the law. Mr Ferreira reported that there were large groupings of Ducktails in Bioemfontein who were increasingly becoming a problem.CAD,
VWN, SW109/4, geographical distribution of the ducktails & CAD, VWN, 747, SW109, vol. Ml, "Monderlingse Vorderings verslae aan sy edele die Minister deur
die Streekhoofde, 17 Julie 1958. The original reports submitted by the following regional divisions are contained in VWN, 747, SW109, vol.II: Kimberiy
26/07/1958, Bloemfontein (2/01/1958), East London (28/12/1957), Port Elizabeth (8/01/1958), Johannesburg, 28/01/1957), Pretoria, 21/03/1956 & 6/12/1957.
38The NBESR (originally the National Bureau of Education) was formed by the government in 1929 with E.G. Malherbe as director. The NBESR was financed
by the government and also received external funding from the American philanthropic Carnegie Corporation. See UG57-'37 and CAD, VWN, 529, SW81/8,
CAD, UOD, 1773 E113/5/2-E113/7/4.
39H.J. Venter (an ex-student of Cronje's) was appointed as the first lecturer and in 1960 and later became the head professor and head of the Department of
Criminology at the University of Pretoria. Like Cronje, his career extended beyond the boundaries of teaching. Besides being a member of the NBESR, he was
also the leader of the committee on road traffic safety and head of the Department of Coloured Affairs in Pretoria and between 1973-74, he was the mayor of
Pretoria.
"°Prof. P.J. van der Waft was head of the Department of Criminology at UNISA and was also Mayor of Pretoria for two years. His academic career and
particularly his studies on 'juvenile delinquency' led him to travel extensively. As a result of his research, he was selected to be a member of the American
Society of Criminology.
41
 Prof. Geoff Cronje played a pivotal role in the development of sociology and criminology as disciplines in South African universities. Not only was Prof. G.
Cronje a prominent intellectual but he also regularly featured in government affairs and in particular in the creation of Afrikaner nationalist ideology and
apartheid policies. He presented evidence at the at the 1944 F.A.K. Volkskongres on Afrikaner racial policy. He is best known for producing 'scientific' evidence
that 'miscegenation led to racial decline' (see Moodie, T.D, The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid and the Afrikaner Civil Religion, University of California
Press, Berekley, 1975, p.248). He also, contributed much to the notion of white supremacy founded on so-called scientific principles. For example, in 1945 he
wrote a series of publications, which elaborated, on Apartheid theory and which were widely read (see S. Dubow, Illicit Union: Scientific Racism in Modem
South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press, Johannesburg, 1995, p.229). A central theme in his work is the idea of racial purity and showed his abhorrence of
miscegenation. These notions of the 'preservation of the white race' reverberated in his and others work on 'juvenile delinquency' in the 1950s.
42CAD, VWN, SW109/4, Circular: Voorgestelde Prosudure vir die Toekoms"March, 1958.
43A list papers were obtained in the evidence presented for the 1958 conference on juvenile delinquency, CAD, VWN, 749, SW109/4.
consequences of increased government interest in youths and of the emerging moral panic are that these anxieties
infiltrated into research agendas endorsed by various university departments most notably in the disciplines of
Sociology and Criminology. Criminology was a relatively new discipline within South Africa with UNISA's department
taking the lead. Academics at the forefront of this new discipline gained reputations for producing 'reliable' studies on
'delinquents'.
Academics played a pivotal role in the lAKJ's first major research project on the nature and extent of youth crime and
measures to control youth offenders and 'disorderly youths' particularly the Ducktails in 1958. After collecting evidence and
testimony, the members of the committee submitted their findings. Amongst the plethora of 'causes of delinquency' that it
identified a lack of parental control and discipline, declining moral standards, working mothers and the diminishing influence
of institutions such as the church and the school were highlighted. After seven meetings,44 the committee made numerous
proposals, which they believed would solve this national 'social problem'. They felt that it was necessary to increase the
responsibility of the parents by bringing them under legislative control. They also called for measures to be introduced
which would deal with youths that were not involved in crime but who were perceived as a direct threat to the 'proper1
functioning of society. The committee's recommendations were only considered in 1960 when the Children's Act was
redesigned.
Whilst the commissions of enquiry were taking place the 'problem of youth' received increased coverage in the press. Moral
guardians used certain press cuttings as 'evidence' for their inquiries. Sensational articles were translated into 'scientific
knowledge'. At the same time, the discourses that members of commissions expressed were reproduced in the press and
assisted in the formation of public opinions on youths. The press presented the Ducktail youth subculture as a monolithic
entity which, by the mid-1950s, was equated with criminal activities and 'juvenile delinquency". Distorted, exaggerated
information written in melodramatic language was relied on. Headlines such as 'Hooliganism in the Transvaal'; 'Thieves
Ravage Benoni Stores'; 'Brutality Near City Hall'; 'Bands of Youths'; 'Clean up the City's Jackals'; 'Hooligans Terrorise
Dancers'; 'Youth Gangs are a Grave Threat to the City'; 'S. Suburbs Gangsterism'; 'Gangs of White Youths Beat up
People'; 'Youth Crisis in Union'; 'Eendstertbendes Anti-Christelik1 reflect this predisposition. The role of the press in the
dissemination of truths' and in this case of moral panics is widely recognised, as Cohen notes:
The media have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own right: even if they are not setf-consciously
engaged in crusading or muck-raking, their very reporting of certain "facts" can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety,
indignation or panic. When such feelings coincide with a perception that particular values need to be protected, the
preconditions for new rule creation or social problem definition are present.46
The language utilised by the press to describe the ducktail phenomenon was emotional drawing on various forms of
symbolism and imagery. Disease imagery featured regularly. 'Ducktailism' was compared to a 'malignant 'social
cancer' which was going to 'infect1 youths throughout the country. An example of this disease imagery is found in a
statement made by Rabbi Harris Swift to the Natal Mercury in 1953: 'no one reason can be found for this startling
social cancer, but it is more than strange that the growth of juvenile delinquency is in inverse ratio to the modern
decrease in home life and the minimisation of morals and religion.'47 Another example is to be found in the Rand Daily
Mail's discussion on youth crime that was described as,
an evil which infects society at its weakest spot for if the young in any number fall into criminal habits, they create for the
authorities an altogether new task in maintaining public order and morality48
Alongside the employment of symbolic and emotional language was the tendency to use inaccurate information, in
particular statistics that were published frequently in the press and at times repeated in later issues. For example, in
1953, Rev HP. Junod expressed concern at the increasing rates of 'delinquency'. He professed that about 10 000
youths are sent to prison annually.49 However, youths in South Africa (and especially white youths) were only sent to
prison in rare cases. According to the Children's Act of 1937:
The Act sets its face against sending children of various age groups (particularly under 19 years and generally in respect
of the group 19-20 years) to gaol to associate with hardened criminals...
Similarly in 1956, Dr. Bain asserted that for the period 1945-1953, convicted 'juvenile delinquents' under twenty had
increased by 60 per cent and in the age group, seventeen to twenty-three had been an increase of at least 90 per cent.
These figures were reproduced by most newspapers in the country and were cited extensively. However, in the age
group seven to sixteen years, the rate of increase in the number of convictions in respect of all offences over the same
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period as Bain's statistics was only 26.9 per cent. The corresponding figure for the age group seventeen to twenty was
23.2 per cent.51 Where convictions did increase was for offences against the Driver's Licence Legislation (code 087).
This amounted to 50 per cent of all crime committed by white 'juvenile adults' in this period.52 Whether Bain or the
press were responsible for the inaccuracies is hard to establish. What is clear however is that this garbled data suited
the press's agenda at the time and that they were at no pains to correct false impressions.
In 1958, the Pretoria News asserted that 'South Africa was facing a Youth Crisis in which the Ducktail element was a
major factor.'53 The press gave the impression that through the adoption of Ducktail style the road to 'delinquency' was
embarked upon. Mr J.A.B. van Zyl (magistrate of the Johannesburg juvenile court) maintained that a 'juvenile
delinquent1, is a 'youngster who won't stay at home at night'. This was based on his observations of three youths 'who
stood before him in court writhing uncomfortably in their padded jackets, creeper shoes and bright socks'.54 The way in
which moral guardians relied on stereotypes55 in their representations of ducktails is clear. The process of stereotyping
not only serves to homogenise the individual or group that is being stereotyped but is also 'one of the major discursive
strategies that ensure that differences between people are recognized. Leyens et al argue that, 'stereotypes are
shared beliefs about person attributes, usually personality traits but often also behaviours of a group of people.'57 In
this case, a process of negative stereotyping based on erroneous assumptions and generalisations was utilised.
Following Leyens et al, a stereotype is a 'category-based judgement' they 'are generalizations based on the
membership to a category, i.e. beliefs that derive from the inference that all members of a given category share the
same properties and are, therefore interchangeable.'58 By using stereotypes, members of the ducktail subculture were
isolated as a specific and 'distinguishable social type' that became equated with 'delinquency' and youth crime.
Although there was a criminal element to the Ducktail subculture the majority of members were not involved in crime.
The adoption of the style of the Ducktails was seen as a 'symptom' and a catalyst for criminal activities. Once the
phenomenon has been labelled the 'devils shape can be identified'.59 Stereotypes reveal much about those involved in
creating the stereotype. The conservatism of moral guardians is clear in their disapproval of the ducktails.
Like stereotypes, rumours 'in retrospect can reveal much about the culture where it flourished and about the nature of
truth in that culture.'60 Most of the rumours surrounding ducktails were initially opinions that later became 'facts'.
Specious information, rumours and stereotypes were not refuted but were rather considered to represent the 'truth' as
they were legitimised by 'experts' from official platforms such as government commissions and universities. As Ashforth
notes:
These inquiries have sought to fashion workable schemes of policy by devising coherent schemes of legitimation - sets of
principles capable of explaining the problems faced by the state and justifying, by virtue of those explanations, the actions
deemed necessary for the future of the state.61
The 'sets of principles', in this case, were a range of discourses utilised for understanding the ducktails whose actions
were perceived as a political threat to white control in all spheres.62 In a sense through their rebellious actions, the
nation's future on the economic, political and social level was under threat as youths are ultimately bearers of the
future. It is surprising that moral guardians did not express any concern at the violence that permeated the subculture in
the form of inter-gang fighting and numerous assaults of African and homosexual men. Rather these youths were
perceived as a threat to the hegemonic culture's values, morality and ideologies. The discourses that will be discussed
below, expressed apartheid ideologies. The institutions that 'organize[d] ideological practices'63 took the form of
commissions of inquiry and govemment initiated research institutes discussed earlier. What started out as research into
youths collapsed into an exploration of wider social concerns where the family, child-rearing, parenting, marriage, working
mothers, religion, morality, leisure and the state of the nation itself came under question. On another level, the government
was embarking on a project, which would institutionalise and set the boundaries between 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate'
behaviour not only of white youths but also of whites in general. The grand murmure of morality was articulated in all of the
discourses that were used to unravel the 'problem of youth'.
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Racial, Religious and Patriarchal Discourses in the Web of Morality64
These multiple discourses - racial, religious, patriarchal - were intertwined with each other and enmeshed within the web of
a grand murmurs, or meta-discourse on morality. In his historiographical overview of discourse studies, Fairclough notes
that discourse is socially constructed 'constituting social subjects, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief,
and the study of discourse focuses upon its constructive ideological effects.'65 However, in this case it seems that the
reverse is tnje namely: that discourses are shaped by and express ideologies as opposed to constructing them. Therefore
in agreement with van Dijk, the fundamental role of discourse' is in the 'expression of ideology as social cognition and in the
reproduction of ideologies in society.'66 This is quite a common feature of discourses:
The expression of ideology in discourse is usually more than just an explicit or concealed display of a person's beliefs, but
mostly also has a persuasive function: speakers want to change the mind of the recipients...'67
Whilst providing an understanding of the workings of society, ideologies also serve to 'regulate social practises'68
becoming more forceful when certain phenomena (resistance or rebellious behaviour for example) are encountered.
The discourses expressed Apartheid ideologies and were ardently articulated because the identities of members of the
ducktail subculture were antithetical to certain characteristics and principles espoused by the architects of Apartheid.
The paper will now turn to a discussion of the 'varied discourses or discourse units'69 which moral guardians utilised in
their explanations of 'delinquency'. The power of these discourses lay in the way in which they informed policies on
youths and the way in which they became embedded in public opinion via the press.
Discourse has become a popular term within academic circles and has been used to refer to bodies of knowledge,
paradigms, and thought processes. Since the 1960s discourse and 'discourse analysis' has become an interdisciplinary
field drawing upon contributions from literature, philosophy and politics. However most the texts are of a philosophical
and technical nature written in esoteric language which at times obfuscates them. Previous scholars have amply
critiqued 'discourse' (as a body of 'knowledge') but it is not my intention to offer an overview or critique of 'discourse
analysis' in this paper.70 Rather, I shall discuss discourse within the historical context of the 1950s with a view to
showing how discourses on white youth expressed and reproduced elements of Apartheid ideology. Here discourse will
be defined broadly to refer to a series of interrelated and overlapping discussions which embody sets of knowledge and
act out relations of power. Recently these new perspectives and paradigms have influenced history. Most notably it has
taken a 'linguistic turn, or, more polemically, the descent into discourse.'71 As Palmer warns, what needs to be avoided
in utilising discourse as an analytical tool is 'the tendency to reify language, objectifying it as unmediated discourse,
placing it beyond social, economic, and political relations, and in the process displacing essential structures and
formations to the historical sidelines.'72 From this point of view, discourses cannot be studied in isolation from the
historical context in which they are produced and reproduced. The discourses on white youths were in part a product of
the 1950s and the ubiquitous force of social engineering that accompanied the implementation of apartheid. Due to the
National Party's slim victory in 1948 (they won seventy seats whereas the United Party won sixty-five seats), their initial
concern was with maintaining power. Both Posel and Lazar argue that 'Apartheid' had been a useful electoral slogan,
but that it was not a practical and consistent blueprint on policy. In its attempts to consolidate power, the National Party
attempted to augment its support. This entailed a policy of 'economic patronage' bestowed upon their main political
constituencies' -farmers, financial capitalists and the working class -. It was also in this period that aspects of
Afrikaner nationalism infiltrated into all spheres of South African society. Apartheid was a doctrine that sought to
dominate Africans whilst privileging all members of the white community - regardless of ethnic affiliation. The NP's rise
to power therefore, afforded white South Africans, and in particular Afrikaans speaking whites, a more privileged
position in the labour market and in the wider social, cultural and political spheres. Simultaneously the new government
encountered a powerful resistance from the very people they were trying to repress. African nationalism adopted a
policy of overt resistance visible in the defiance campaign, the freedom charter, and the congress alliance. To ensure
the reproduction of this dominant position in society Apartheid ideologues could not allow a group of apolitical, 'immoral'
white youths to rebel on any level.
64
 Discourse in this paper is broadly based on a definition outlined by Button and Carlen as, 'a discrete set of statements/knowledges/modes of knowing, that
has a specific structure' which 'can be shown to derive from a set of relationships which have both discursive and extra-discursive forms and effects' that 'are
realised as subjective effects: author, reader, object, Other and Imaginary.' F. Burton and P. Carlen, Official Discourse: On discourse analysis, government
publications, ideology and the state, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979, pp. 31-32.
N. Fairclough, Discourses and Social Change, Polity Press, USA, 1992, p. 36.
66
 T. A. van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary approach, Sage, London, 1998, p. viii
87




 C. Linde, 'Discourse Analysis, Structuralism, and the Description of Social Practice' in G.R. Guy, C. Feagin, D. Schiffrin and J. Baugh (eds) Towards a Social
Science of Language, papers in honour of William Labov, Social Interaction and Discourse structures, John Benjamins, Amserdam, 1997, p. 12.
70
 For a general introduction to this vast subject see: T.A. van Dijk, Handbook of Discourse Analysis, 4 volumes, Academic Press, London, 1985 and N. Fairclough
Discourse and Social Change, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. For a discussion of the relationship between discourse and the subject see M. Bracher et al (eds),
Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure and Society, New York University Press, New York 1994.
71
 B. D. Palmer, Descent into Discourse: The Relocation of Language and the Writing of Social History, Temple University Press, 1990, p.3.
72
 Ibid.; p. 5.
73
 However , it must be noted at th is point that t he National ist government did not implement all demands made by the capitalist sector. Thus the government,
contrary t o O 'Meara , Wo lpe and Legassick 's argument , w a s not sensit ive t o general capitalist development . Rather, their immediate interest was satisfying its
electoral base.
As stressed earlier, discourse, 'has a special status in the reproduction of ideologies...Various properties of text and
talk allow social members to actually express or formulate abstract ideological beliefs, or any other opinion related to
such ideologies.'74 Discourse as discussed below, is limited to the written word where 'sets of "intertextually" related
discourses', 5 exist. In other words, there is a multiplicity of discourses expressed by different interlocutors making it
increasingly difficult to distinguish where one ends and the other begins. Ideologies are 'mapped on to different levels
and dimensions of discourse, each with its own structures or strategies.'76 An attention to discourse therefore facilitates
firstly a 'social account of subjectivity by attending to the linguistic resources by which the socio-political realm is
produced and reproduced,'77 and secondly an historical account of the production of knowledge on subjects such as
'juvenile delinquency1 in the 1950s.
The way in which political values, beliefs and ideologies underlie the language used is a central element in discourse. Much
can be learnt from what is not said. In this particular case, discourses reveal more about the speakers than their 'objects' of
inquiry. Common to these discourses is the way in which youths are characterised as a 'problem' whose solution must be
urgently sought in order to save the nation from moral degeneration and to maintain white dominance. The implication is
that certain whites have moral standards and 'Others' do not. Using such discourses the Nationalist government and its
instruments formulated what they wanted white citizens to be and how they should behave. Strategies of cognition and
discourses on the problem of youth' followed a similar pattern: i) moral necessity; ii) national rhetoric; and iii) negative
characteristics of Others (working mothers, youths).
One of the dominant discourses that intellectuals and government officials utilised in understanding the root causes of
'delinquency' was a racial one which was underpinned by notions of racism, civilisation and superiority. In South Africa race
has been a principle element in shaping white identities. Surprisingly little has been written on white racial identities.78
Rather, studies on race have become synonymous with examinations of black racial identities. However, racial identities
'are not only Black, Latino, Native American and so on: they are also white. To ignore white ethnicity is to redouble its
hegemony by naturalising it.'79 Much can be learnt about race from studies produced by US labour historians and their
exploration of the intersection between race and class. Wellman, for example, makes an important contribution in his call for
the need to account for the 'process through which whiteness gets invented'80 by stressing the dynamic nature of the
'construction of whiteness' which has 'multiple meanings...produced by interaction between groups and ideas.'81 Racial
identities are therefore socially constructed. Roediger's work on the 'invention of whiteness' is illuminating due to his
insistence of the social construction of race. As Teun van Oijk warns racism, 'is not just in the streets nor the exclusive
reaction of ordinary white folks in a social or economic impasse' but it is also 'enacted and preformulated by various elite
groups and their discourses.'82 In the South African context churches, schools, the media, government legislation and
intellectual traditions all played a role in shaping white identities although this has rarely been explored.
This ideology of white supremacy and the negative stereotypes that accompanied it were generated to have a long and
enduring history, which can be traced back to at least 1875.83 In the 1950s they were articulated in commissions of
enquiry that were set up to investigate various 'social problems' most notably 'juvenile delinquency1 and drug abuse
facing the white community. Racial discourse expressed in this manner reveals what the government wanted white
citizens to be. By expressing the importance of believing in white supremacy moral guardians and rule creators were
also mobilising a national white identity, which cut across linguistic divides between English and Afrikaans speakers.
Another notion that was consistently expressed was the fear of whites 'degenerating' into the 'black masses'. This
display of ethnocentrism, white chauvinism and overt racism underpinned this 'construction of whiteness'. However,
there are multiple types of racism, as van Dijk stresses:
racism does not consist of only white supremacist ideologies of race, or only of aggressive overt or blatant discriminatory
acts, the forms of racism as it is currently understood in informal conversations, in the media, or in much of the social
sciences. Racism also involves the everyday, mundane, negative opinions, attitudes, ideologies and the seemingly subtle
acts and conditions of discrimination against minorities, namely, those social cognitions and social acts, processes,
structures, or institutions that directly or indirectly contribute to the dominance of the white group and the subordinate
position of minorities.8*
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The idea of race, latent and explicit, was consistently invoked indicating how racist ideology permeated research
institutes and government commissions. This is hardly surprising since government commissions and research entities
were coloured With an ethnic bias. The role of academics in these institutes gave them a rostrum to further their own
areas of interest via government initiated research projects. Most of the head researchers were Afrikaans speaking and
intellectually and politically supported white supremacist ideology85 as reflected in the discourses they used for
d t d i _ y m i t h s ^ h _ e _ m ^ ^
interest (in moral decay for example) overlapped with the government's policing of the boundaries of white behaviour.
In doing so, these moral guardians became advocates of racist doctrines through their complicity with the racist
paradigm of the state. As Oubow notes:
Ideological racism may be an intellectual response to, or formulation of , popular racist sentiment. It may at the same time
help to construct and maintain such attitudes. In the case of segregation and apartheid, racist ideology both reflected and
grew out of already existing notions of human difference. But in helping to systematise and rationalise such assumptions,
it also worked to entrench them legislatively and ideologically. K
This was especially evident where the fear of racial contamination, miscegenation and the 'threat1 of racial
degeneration arose. Here the 'reproduction of racism is essentially geared toward the maintenance of white group
control'.87 In his remarks on the 1956 conference on juvenile delinquency Dr Bain observed:
I am glad this Conference is confined to European delinquency. Sometimes I think we spend too much time talking about
the Non-European and his needs, and too little about the needs of our fellow Europeans. In any case, I feel we are talking
too much about the Non-European's rights and grievances, and too little about his obligations, his responsibilities and the
many good things he enjoys and has been given by the white man.88
The racist discourse was expressed in the language of morality, nationalism and leadership. Dr Bain's comments on
the necessity of combating the 'social evil' of 'juvenile delinquency' echoes this refrain:
Apart from all moral and religious consideration, the white man's economic, social and political status in this country demand
that we do everything possible to prevent moral decay undermining the white man's leadership. If we do not we shall be
committing racial suicide. For generations to come, the Europeans will continue to be the custodians of millions of our citizens
now emerging into the light of new opportunities and new ways of living. And this will remain the white man's responsibility and
challenge no matter what social, economic, or other changes may occur in the meantime. But the European shall not maintain
such leadership and shall have no moral claim or right to retain such leadership if they become morally decadent The white
man's position in South Africa will be maintained not by legislation alone, although certain legislation will always be necessary,
nor by force of arms, but rather by the strength and durability of his moral status. We cannot therefore allow juvenile
delinquency or any other social evil to weaken that status. And we shall prevent any weakening of our nation's moral strength
only by facing up to our social evils, fairly, squarely and honestly, and by working together to remove these evils...Here as
Europeans, we are all one, all South Africans, working for one common goal - the welfare of our youth, that is, for the future of
South Africa we all love...89
Racial discourses were expressed under the guise of a national rhetoric warning the public that a solution needed to be
sought for the good of 'our1 country otherwise the "white man' would occupy subordinate positions. Dr. Bain's comments
also indicate the type of citizen which the government sought to create. It is this shaping of whiteness that has been patchily
researched. White identities for them should be characterised by a high moral code and the belief in white supremacy and
the nation. Most would agree that an underlying component of Apartheid ideology was Afrikaner Nationalism90, which
was founded on notions of the volk and groepsgebondenheid (group attachment). An individuals growth to full humanity
was thought to be possible only if people identified with their nation. As Diederichs phrased it:
Mankind is not merely called to be a member of a community', is also, and especially, called to be a member of a
nation...Only through his devotion to, his love for and his service to the nation can man come to the versatile and
harmonious development of his full personality...The nation is the fulfilment of the individual life.91
The notion of teaching whites the importance of retaining their dominant position is clearly illustrated further in J.G.
Strijdom's admonition:
If the European loses his colour sense, he cannot remain a white man...On the basis of unity you cannot retain your
colour if there is no apartheid in everyday social life, in the political sphere or whatever sphere it may be, and if there is no
residential separation... South Africa can only remain a white country if we continue to see that the Europeans remain the
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dominant nation; and we can only remain the dominant nation if we have the power to govern the country and if the
Europeans, by means of their efforts, remain the dominant section.92
These examples reflect how intellectuals and public figures accepted racism and served to reproduce racist ideology into
public opinion. In another example, Dr. J.H. van Eden (the major of Vereeninging) at a conference on juvenile affairs
convened by the Juvenile Affairs Board, believed that:
There is little doubt that in our multi-racial society the Europeans are obsessed with the fear that our position of authority
and leadership will be usurped by the far more numerous non-Europeans whose thirst for knowledge is becoming more
and more apparent. That fear which is either actual or sub-conscious is understandable because we, as the more civilised
section, have every right to expect to control the non-whites who are far less civilised.93
Fears of occupying a subordinate position of power were expressed through racist imagery that drew on notions of civility.
The implications were that the African majority was 'uncivilised' and incapable of effective governance. Literary devices in
particular repetition stressed these negative features of the Other in this case, of the African majority. The use of rhetorical
devices such as repetition also has a persuasive function. Imagery of whiteness being swamped and drowned by blacks
featured regularly. For example Die Vaderfand, believed that in a country where whites are surrounded by a "black sea"
they could not afford to allow the youth to become useless:
Suid-Afrika met sy klein bevolking, in 'n omringende swart see, kan dit die minste van almal bekostig dat 'n deel van sy
jeugdige mensemateriaal die weg van totale onberuikbaarheid bewandel.94
By continually counterposing whites to the 'Other' the characteristics between Them (blacks) and Us (whites) are
articulated. They are characterised by 'Our' 'negative mirror image...Whatever values and principles We share, They
don't have them'.95 Bipolar oppositions such as superior - inferior, respectable - not respectable, civilised - uncivilised,
intelligent - stupid were relied on. Racial discourse became one of the dominant discourses utilised for explaining
'delinquent' and 'deviant white youths. Misbehaviour was perceived as a type of degeneration into immorality that was
perceived as a characteristic of black behaviour. In order to reproduce white domination the government and its moral
guardians could not risk letting a group of recalcitrant, apolitical, 'immoral', 'deviant' and hedonistic youths undermine
their beliefs because the future of the country and volk depended on these youths. Intertwined with their concern for the
state of the nation and the importance of sustaining white superiority was their consistent questioning of morality
articulated further through a religious discourse.
Moral decay was equated with 'race suicide'. In order to prevent this rigorous moralising as well as a re-assertion of
Christian principles were deemed necessary. The subcommittee on the Church, at the 1956 Conference on Juvenile
Delinquency, proclaimed that 'the present weakening of moral fibre results from the lack of religion in our society today.'
They believed that the church should 'get men to accept, religion, thereby establishing a basis for morals.' * They would
achieve these goals further by the formation of a public morality council under the guidance of the Church.97 Christian-
Nationalist ideology was central to Apartheid and was comprised of a range of different yet interrelated ideas including
Dutch neo-Calvinism and German Romanticism. The major progenitors argued that the 'Christianization' of an ethnic
group enriched its national identity. Lazar notes that this principle demanded that children should love their culture,
tradition and nation. The teaching of Christian principles was commonly proposed a solution to 'delinquency'.
Members of the NG kerk in the Transvaal denigrated ducktails as 'anti-Christ'. In fact, the whole movement was
labelled 'antichristelik en ateeistie'.99
Attempts to re-assert Christianity were initiated in August 1950 when branches of the International Child Evangelism
Fellowship launched a campaign to 'reform young gangsters.'100 Youths organised the meetings themselves, which
were usually held on the streets. Members of the community also made calls for the increasing role of the Church and
spiritual guidance. For example, in a letter to the Pretoria News a 'sympathetic mother', felt that:
It is time every redeemed soul should enlist in the battle against Satan and sin to save our youth in the name of Jesus
Christ. Let us return to God's word, to God's remedy for sin, let every saved soul get down on our knees and weep and
pray and have pity for the lost.101
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By invoking images of Satan and demonising the ducktail subculture, this religious discourse justified policies of
religious indoctrination where 'virtuous' Christian principles were imposed on aberrant white youths. In this case the
'redeemed' become proselytisers on a mission to save 'lost1 souls from the perils of sin. Mr J.A. Ridder, Secretary of
Social Welfare, argued that, 'Only the churches, with the backing of the resources of the state and the co-operation of
parentswhowoulchthemselves-set-a moralcode-of-behaviour—could-deter-South-Afriea^s-youth from-following-the
pattern of unrulipess and contempt for authority'. He believed that increasing 'delinquency1 was the 'biggest social
problem of the day*. He contended that reformatories and national conferences would not solve the problem. He argued
further that, 'if the boppers, ducktails and even the less blameworthy youth that crowd our public places break public
sanctions and outrage public opinion, then we must ask ourselves: Is our own moral standard high enough?' He then
went on to argue that it is the church's duty to prevent further 'delinquency'.102 Christianity was seen as the most
effective means for inculcating youths with a more appropriate morality.
Besides advocating an increased role for the Church and a re-assertion of Christian virtues, the structure of the family
was also questioned in which parents and particularly working mother's were sharply criticised for their poor skills of
child-rearing. Parallel to the religious and racist discourses was a patriarchal discourse. Numerous calls were made to
confine the activities of women in the domestic realm. This patriarchal discourse was not exclusively held by men who
wanted to re-establish patriarchal control over women. Rather, this 'the cult of domesticity was a crucial, if concealed,
dimension of male as well as female identities - shifting and unstable as these were - and an indispensable element
both of the industrial market and the imperial enterprise.'103 For example, a woman made one of the earliest calls for an
enforcement of patriarchy. In her paper, presented at the Conference on Alcoholism in 1951, Gael Fraser argued that,
A mother's place is in the home! No woman, with young children should be allowed to leave her under-twelve year old-
children in order to go out to work to supplement the home budget! These unfortunate youngsters are left in the charge of
irresponsible native or coloured servants, or more frequently left to fend for themselves. These children
become...uncouth, slovenly, foul-tongued brats. These "motherless" children have no-one to supervise them during their
playing hours and thus the delinquent is born.104
At the centre of this patriarchal discourse was the 'cult of domesticity1 in which it was believed that a woman's place was in
the home. 'If they went out to work they were considered to risk moral corruption.'105 Instead, they were expected to stay at
home and confine themselves to domestic duties thereby fulfilling the roles of wife-hood and motherhood. For N.M.J. van
Rensberg the role of women as wives had altered:
Lewe ons vroue vandag nog soos dit Christenvroue betaam? Gehoorsaam hulle hul mans, en gedra hulle hulle soos 'n
hulp vir die man? Nee op elke gebied in die lewe ding hulle met die man mee, en in menige huis is die man die hulp, en
die vrou regeer en verdryf die man as't ware met haar mannetjiesagtigheid. Elke vrou moet haar wettige man onderdanig
wees. Die Here beveel dit en dit moet so wees.. .Die tout le in die ouerhuis en wel in die sin dat die Woord van God nie
meer die rigsnoer is nie. 10e
The disapproval of mothers working was in response to the increased independence that women enjoyed during the
World War Two. As noted by Hyslop, the newly found independence of women weakened patriarchal authority.
Working mothers (and fathers to an extent) encountered a range of problems when balancing the role of motherhood
and work. One such problem was that after-care facilities, such as nursery schools and creches, were not only scarce
but also expensive.1 One way of alleviating the difficulties of balancing work and parenting was to place children in the
care of domestic workers. However, this practise was also sharply criticised. For example, in a letter to the editor of the
Argus "Vigilant of Constantia" maintained that, the wife took on a full-time job and 'no one cares for the children, except,
perhaps, a Native maid. That is problem one. Problem two is the example set by the parents.'108 Once again a woman
also supported such arguments, Thelma Brown contended that mothers:
...cannot get out to work quickly enough, leaving their children in the hands of incompetent Natives whose intellectual
abilities and mental development are considered far below the standard of their superior masters...we are creating in our
midst a ruthless mob who will eventually cause of a reign of terror among respectable citizens. We face a problem; we
parents must now try to train our children ourselves - not leave them to the willy-nilly care of Natives at home, nor thrust
our responsibility on our overworked schools. The onus of our children will fall mainly on the mother. This is her job - not
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the job in an office or shop which pays a few pounds, but the greatest job of all times, paying us dividends by creating
healthy-minded, sensible citizens of the future."109
Notions of us ('Europeans') versus them ('natives') were invoked yet again by using bipolar oppositions such as
superior-inferior, respectable-indecent, skilled-unskilled. Here racial and patriarchal discourses are intertwined
characterising the 'native' as 'inferior1 and 'stupid'. McClintock's observations of colonial society ring true for post World
war Two South Africa. She argues that the:
invention of race...became central not only to the self-definition of the middle class but also to the policing of the
"dangerous classes": the working class, the Irish, Jews, prostitutes, feminists, gays and lesbians, criminals, the militant
crowd and so on.110
Consequently in 1955, Mr G.F. Olivier, Chief Government Social Welfare and Probation Officer for Johannesburg
advocated the compulsory supervision of children after school hours as a solution to increasing "delinquency".1
Similarly, Mr J.A. de Ridder (the Secretary for Social Welfare) believed that the primary cause of delinquency was "the
disruption of the family, especially when the mother is out of the home for the greater part of the day". According to the
Rand Daily Mail Ms was sanctioned by the report that there is "little delinquency in smaller towns and none at all on the
farms, where mothers are usually at home." Mr. R. Whiteford principal of the South African College High School
believed that, 'the danger of juvenile delinquency lies in the more prosperous families in which the mother is away from
home all day.'113 The criticisms of women and mothers working resulted in a commission of enquiry under Prof. Geoff
Cronje.114
By 1956 this patriarchal discourse manifested itself into an intensified opposition to mothers working when calls were made
to legally confine women in the home as it was believed that the 'mother at home is the basis of the emotional stability of
the child'115. At the 1956 Johannesburg conference on Juvenile Delinquency, the subcommittee on the home, chaired by Mr
J.H. Coetzee, suggested that:
a) Attempts should be made to reduce financial disabilities as far as possible so that mothers are not forced to go out and work
b) Mothers should be encouraged to stay at home during the first six years of her child's life.
c) Married women should not work in the afternoons and non-working mothers should not leave their children uncared for in
the afternoons, when children are home from school.116
The education subcommittee, likewise, proposed that the 'adequate family allowances' be introduced Io allow the wives of
wage earners in the lower income groups to remain with their children. This condemnation of working mothers reflects
the government and their moral guardian's attempts to enforce patriarchal control more strictly in order to sustain the
structure of the 'ideal' family in which the male would function as the breadwinner. Wife-hood and motherhood were
portrayed as the supreme virtues of women.
The patriarchal discourse reverberated further into the field of marriage and parenting. The subcommittee on the 'home' felt
that prospective marriage partners should be trained in relationships and child rearing. It was further recommended that
ministers be given the power to prevent couples from getting married if they were not adequately prepared and that
measures to make divorce more difficult be introduced. Calls were also made to punish and treat 'defaulting parents', as it
was believed that 'parents are the most important cause of the phenomenon of juvenile delinquency.'118Similarly, the Port
Elizabeth committee resolved that married couples should be trained in the methods of child rearing in order to discipline
their children in the 'habits of self-control, courtesy, obedience and proper behaviour'.119 They also called for churches,
schools and welfare societies to 'use their influence to arouse the consciences of parents to the vital necessity of bringing-
up their children in the proper manner.'120
Academics also held similar views regarding parenting. For example, Prof. B.F. Nel (director of the Child Guidance
Clinic in Pretoria) blamed "the modern parent for the ducktail problem in South Africa." He believed that present day
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parents needed to be educated, especially in spiritual guidance - first before the problem is solved.121 Dr D.G. Steyn (of
the Department of Sociology at the University of Pretoria) in an address to the Bond van Dienaresse van die N.G. Kerk
gemmente in Pretoria, believed that parents must take the blame for delinquency:
Aan ouers is sekere pligte opgedra en sekere eise word aan hulle gestel. As hulle dit versaak, kom wangedrag by die
kindersvoorTTzdie-gesinvolledig-met-vaderen-moeder-moet-wees^Die-ouers-moet-geestelik-en-liggaamlik-volwaardig
wees en die regte peil van opvoeding, sedelikheid en godsdiens he.i22
A Johannesburg QC felt that a wider interpretation of the Children's Act be employed to force parents to be responsible
for their children's 'delinquency1.123 In a similar vein Mr W.R Retief (a probation officer of the Department of Social
Welfare), at a meeting of parents and teachers in Johannesburg, felt that it was the parents duty to alleviate the
national problem of delinquency. He argued that a constructive approach was, 'the marriage guidance movement1
which could become 'a powerful factor in training young people for proper parenthood.'124 On the fourth of April in the
senate Mr. Serfontein (minister of Social Welfare) maintained that, 'juvenile delinquency was regarded as a serious
problem, not only by his department but by the government.' He suggested that jail sentences be imposed on negligent
parents, tightening up of reformatory conditions and the extension of Social Welfare services. In March 1958,
Minister of Justice Mr Swart requested that parliament approve a recent piece of legislation which gave extra powers to
the police to arraign delinquents before a magistrate. Thereafter the parents would be called in to take some of the
responsibility. If parents could not control their children then they would be placed in some sort of battalion or
institution.125
By collapsing into discussions on parenting, child rearing, marriage and working mothers, it is clear that moral
guardians used 'juvenile delinquency' as a metaphor for exploring more widely perceived social fears. The moral
panic was raised to new heights through the formulation of a range of discourses enmeshed in the web of a grand
discourse on morality. Common to all discourses was an argument that attempted to convince the public that the
'problem of youth' was a moral one. Moral discourses lead to an investigation of popular culture, leisure and
entertainment. Morality for Hunt 'is a collection of ideas that evaluate human actions and, on the basis of its
evaluation of these acts, also evaluates the agents who do them.'127 In this case, it was argued that places of
entertainment bred immorality and members of the subculture that frequented these places were branded as
immoral, criminal and dangerous. Entertainment (especially unsupervised entertainment) has always been of great
concern for the government and parents. However, in the 1950s these anxieties increased due to the expansion of popular
culture visible in the establishment of new forms of entertainment Early complaints were articulated in August 1937 when
the Provincial Consultative Committee expressed concern at 'the problem of 'Pin Tables' and similar automatic
machines.'128 They believed that:
The government is therefore urged to introduce legislation to prohibit the manufacture, import and use of machines in the
Union, as in the opinion of the Board such gambling machines are detrimental to the moral welfare of the young.129
Many other forms of entertainment were considered to be 'dangerous' to the moral standards of youths. These included
films and places of entertainment such as the bioscope, and fashion trends. For example, in 1950, the prosecutor of the
Pretoria Juvenile Court informed a reporter of the Star that 'in most of the cases that came before the court, the motives
for the crimes were not material gain but rather the emulation of gangster methods shown in the cinemas.'130 Likewise
in 1953 Rev. H.P. Junod claimed at a meeting of the Pretoria Nursery School Society, that, 'another great cause was
the provocation of youth by the immoral, pornographic and nerve racking influence of the cinema, cheap literature and
detailed press reports of crime.131 Films and frequenting the cinema was isolated, by moral guardians, as a principle
cause for African 'delinquency' (in the form of tsotsis) in the 1950s.132 In the same period in the United States of
America, the media was identified as a cause youth crime. For example, Alastair Buchan (a reporter) contended that,
'the most potent cause is the deification of violence and crime through the radio, television and the cinema.'133 Similar
concerns at youth's 'misspent free time' were expressed at Dr Bain's 1956 conference. They concluded that the
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frequenting of bioscopes, cafe-bioscopes, billiard rooms, roadhouses and dance halls was 'immoral' and
'unconstructive'.
This moral discourse was the driving force that sustained and propelled the moral panic over youths in the 1950s. As a
whole the panic served to "clarify where the important but temporarily obscured borderline between right and wrong,
between permitted and not permitted, should be drawn."134 Although youths were at the centre of this moral panic the
behaviour of white adults was also questioned. Each of the discourses explicitly expressed an underlying concern that white
working mothers and rebellious youths were crossing the boundary and degenerating into immorality. In this period
immorality was clearly equated with racist notions on the Native'. From this, it seems that moral panics set and policed the
boundaries defining V/hiteness'. Through the role played by moral guardians it seems that such panics are 'not only a
matter of societal, cultural, and moral boundaries but also of those involved in one's own identity; perhaps one not only
attempts to establish power over others but also over forces within oneself. The forcefulness of the panics and the
vehemence of the actors indicate that the conflicts involved are very deep.'135 Power therefore played a central role in this
moral panic, it traverses and produces things...forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a
productive network which runs through the whole social body.'136
Power, Knowledge, Truth: Effects of Discourse
The power of these interrelated and overlapping discourses is in the effects that were produced because they were
widely circulated. Firstly, as discussed earlier they served to express and reproduce apartheid ideologies. Secondly,
they were transmitted to the public via the press. Thirdly, they were raised to the level of truths that constituted a new
body of knowledge on juvenile delinquency. Thereafter this knowledge was utilised in the process of amending existing
legislation and transforming policies on youth. This was not a smooth process. The research conducted into youth
extended over a period of five years and was only incorporated into legislation in 1960. Even though these discourses
were founded on fallacious and at times garbled data they were accorded truth values as they were articulated by
'experts' and produced within the interstices of official and well respected institutions. As Foucault explains:
Each society has its regime of truth: that is the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged
with saying what counts as true.'137
Similarly, Leps argues
the truth of a period corresponds not to the closest perception of a primary reality, but rather to the sets of information
which, having been legitimized by institutions, organize the mode of being, the social arrangement, the historic reality of
people and products. Thus, power is not a thing one can acquire or maintain by force, or at least, not by force alone;
rather, power is both the result and the support of a complex system of production and distribution of knowledge which,
one in circulation, acquires a truth value placing it in a position of domination...138
As will be discussed below the discourses on youths fed into a new type of knowledge on delinquency and were later
included in legislative amendments most notably to the Children's Act. In such instances, 'knowledge of other people'
becomes "an instrument of power over other people.'139 This leads to yet another question, namely 'whom does
discourse serve?'140 In this case, the discourses served the interests of the government and their moral guardians. The
result was the transformation of the juvenile justice system, the shutting down of cinemas, campaigns to popularise Boy
Scouts, Voortrekkers, Girl Guides, the initiation of Church Lad's Brigades, increased regulation and the surveillance of
youths' behaviour by ghost squads and commissions. On a more subtle level, the state was formulating their vision of
what they considered appropriate white behaviour to encapsulate. When considering the range of discourses mobilised
for understanding the 'problem' of youth and the preventative methods and solutions imposed to curtail the outbreak of
similar activities it is quite clear that these new modes of punishment functioned as 'a political tactic'.141 The legislative
modifications introduced by the government also reveal the state's fluctuating positions of power which enabled them to
develop, 'power techniques orientated towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent
way.'14*
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Most of the proposed solutions to solve the problem of youth were incorporated into the Children's Act (no 33) of 1960.
Under the revised provisions, a child was considered to be under the age of eighteen and not twenty-one as declared
previously. This would give the justice system more power to deal harshly with youths over eighteen. A 'child in need of
care' included children who suffered from 'geestelike verwaariosingf. When read in conjunction with Article 26 a
'polisiebeampte of proefbeamte nou ook so 'n van enige plek na 'n veiligheidsplek bring om uiteindelik 'n ondersoek na
sy sorgbehoewindheid'te^7aar/7dl/7~Adcntionally7"the responsibility oflhe parents was legally enforced. According to
Article 31 a children's court 'ook nou gelas dat 'n kind se ouer of voog moet voldoen aan sodasnige voorgeskrewe
vereistes as wat die hof mag bepaalby gebreke waarvan hy gestraf kan word.'The Minister of Justice believed that
through these amendments 'ledige en losbandig" children including the 'soegenaamde eendsterte' would be
controlled.143
It was also in the 1960s that white boys were forced to undertake military training through the passing of the Defence
Act of 1957. The defence act declared that, 'all medically fit white male citizens of South Africa are liable to be called up
to do National service in the year in which they turn eighteen'. It must be stressed that all white males (citizens or not)
who resided in South Africa for five years were legally required to complete national service for twelve months or be
sentenced to detention for 18 months.
The government believed that with these new measures in place, 'delinquency' would decrease and the ducktails would
effectively be eliminated. The permanent committee would monitor the behaviour of youth: Interdepartmental Kommitee
Insake Jeugmisdaad. The Committee's work had been suspended to resolve the debate surrounding who the Committee
should report to. The Interdepartmental Committee on Rehabilitation Services (the Gauche Committee) eventually
recommended, in 1964, that it should be the responsibility of the Department of Social Welfare and Pensions. The
committee resumed its duties of monitoring the behaviour of youths and children again in 1964.144
The control of white youths, their identities and behaviour was part of the National Party's wider projects: of the shaping of
whiteness, social engineering, and the reproduction of white domination. The latter was related to another project that
sought to bolster their support by lowering the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen. According to Lazar, this issue had
been on the government's agenda between 1953-58, but was only legislated in 1958 after the election of that year. The
objective was to gain more votes. In 1955 it was estimated that 127 400 eligible voters were between eighteen and
twenty.145 Thus, there was a strong need for the government to persuade recalcitrant youths to conform to their vision of
appropriate white behaviour. The Ducktail's hedonism, apolitical attitudes, anti-work ethic, disrespect for law, property,
rejection of education and upward social mobility had to be contained and white youths were urged to conform in order to
reproduce the government's vision of white domination.
Conclusion
The ducktail subculture ignited real and imagined fears into the government and other moral guardians. The violent
dimension of the subculture was never raised as a point of concern for moral guardians. Rather, they were concerned with
the 'immoral' behaviour of youths. Their responses were based on distortions, stereotypes and rumours that resulted in the
unfolding of a moral panic from government commissions, academic texts and the press. The racial, religious and
patriarchal discourses (intertwined in the consistent theme of morality) used for an understanding of these youths led to a
questioning of the status of working mothers, parenting, child rearing, religion, morality and the state of the nation.
Discourses in this case were produced within the historical context of the National Party's wider policy of social engineering.
They also expressed and reproduced dimensions of Apartheid ideologies. The effect of these discourses is the way in
which they were translated into truths and constituted a body of knowledge on juvenile delinquency that later transformed
legislation and led to the establishment of a permanent committee set up to monitor the behaviour of white youths.
Additionally the governments attempts to shape white identities into being conformist, nationalist law abiding citizens who
valued the very principles of apartheid ideologies - morality, Christian-Nationalism and white superiority is revealed. From
this it is evident that in the 1950s white youths were
treated as a key indicator of the state of the nation itself: it is expected to reflect the cycle of booms and troughs in
the economy; shifts in cultural values over sexuality, morality and family life; and changes in class relations,
concepts of nationhood, and in occupational structures. Young people are assumed to hold the key to the nation's
future, and the treatment and management of 'youth' is expected to provide the solution to a nation's 'problems',
from 'drug abuse', 'Hooliganism' and 'teenage pregnancy' to inner city 'riots'. The everyday operations of
international capitalism or patriarchal power relations are seldom represented as the source of such 'social
problems'.146
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